Jihadist activities were blamed for precipitating the last two coups in Burkina Faso this year.
In less than nine months, Burkina Faso has experienced two coups.
The first was led on January 24 by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba before he himself was ousted eight months later by Captain Ibrahim Traore.
This second coup, which began on September 30 and ended on October 2, after mediation by customary and religious authorities while Damiba tried to retain power, was the result of a combination of circumstances.
“The risky choices made by Lieutenant Colonel Damiba have gradually weakened our security system and the administrative red tape that characterized the fallen regime has worsened under the transition, thus jeopardizing strategic operations,” said Captain Traore’s comrades.
According to several observers, it was the attack on a supply convoy on September 26 in Gaskinde, in the northern province of Soum that precipitated the fall of Lieutenant Colonel Damiba.
Damiba, caught up in the Inata syndrome
After this attack, tensions rose between Damiba and certain soldiers, particularly the “Cobras” Unit, which reportedly lost a dozen of its members. The anger of these soldiers was heightened by the fact that they had difficulty collecting their bonuses on time.
When they were attacked by jihadists on November 14, 2021, the gendarmes of the Inata detachment in the west of the Soum province were in the same situation: for several days, they had no food.
The garrison commander had alerted Ouagadougou, the capital, about the situation of his men, who were forced to hunt for food.
The anger of the population following this attack, which left 57 dead, including 52 gendarmes, prompted President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, who was in power at the time, to make adjustments to his security services.
Heads rolled in the military command.
It was through this overhaul of the military hierarchy that Lieutenant Colonel Paul Henri Damiba was appointed commander of the 3rd military region.
He took advantage of this position to overthrow Roch Kabore.
“In view of the deterioration of the security situation and the clear inability of the power of Roch Marc Christian Kabore to unite the Burkinabe to deal effectively with the situation and following the exasperation of the various social strata of the nation, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration had decided to assume its responsibilities before history,” Damiba’s friends had explained.
Catapulted to the title of “President of the Transition,” Damiba promised to turn things around.
To this end, he set up a framework for dialogue with jihadists who wish to lay down their arms.
To reshape the response to jihadist attacks, a National Theater Operations Command (COTN) was created and entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Yves Didier Bamouni, who was commander of the 1st military region.
But the desired changes did not occur as jihadist attacks intensified. Taking stock of the “operation to reconquer the territory,” Lieutenant Colonel Damiba promised to rectify the situation, but it was too little too late for him.
A first homemade bomb attack targeted a convoy bound for Ouagadougou, between Djibo and Bourzanga. At least 37 civilians were killed. Twenty days later, a supply convoy bound for the same town of Djibo was intercepted by Islamist insurgents near Gaskinde.
The latest army report acknowledges the death of 37 people, including 27 soldiers and 10 civilians.
This was enough for part of the army to decide to overthrow Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba.
Actions with political dividends
Two days after this second putsch in eight months, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM), linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claimed to have dealt “an economic blow that caused an earthquake in the ranks of the army, which resulted in a military coup.”
“They have the foresight to see that the attack on Inata led to the first coup and that the last attack on Gaskinde led to the second coup. So they don’t hesitate to bring it up and take political advantage of it because their actions on the ground are always for political purposes. They are increasing the pressure on the government forces, on the people, so that they stop cooperating with the government forces,” said Wassim Nasr, a journalist with France24 and a specialist in jihadist movements.
This causal link between the deteriorating security situation and political instability seems to be known to the new coup authorities.
The day after his installation as head of the junta, Captain Traore asked ministries’ permanent secretaries, who are responsible for handling current affairs, to speed up the execution of the tasks assigned to them, in the absence of the government that was dissolved on the evening of September 30.
According to the new strongman in Ouagadougou, “we must do in three months what should have done in twelve months. But the GSIM warned the new people in charge of the country against any attempt to favor war.
“If you want war, we are more than ready,” the jihadists threatened, adding, “if you want peace, seek it through the proper channels.”
This message from the jihadists “leaves the door open to negotiations, which are part of the palette of means used by GSIM and al Qaeda in general. So they combine military pressure and blockade, while leaving the door open for negotiations,” Wassim Nasr opined.
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