The Burkinabe authorities short of reviving the G5 Sahel are condemned to forge a strategic alliance with Mali to pacify the north of their country.
Like his predecessor on September 3, Captain Ibrahim Traoré reserved his first foreign visit for neighbouring Mali on Wednesday November 2.
The president of the transition in Burkina Faso was received by his Malian counterpart, Colonel Assimi Goïta, in power since May 24, 2021, following the ouster of Colonel Major Bah N’dao and his Prime Minister Moctar Ouane.
At the end of his meeting with the head of the Malian junta, the 34-year-old captain said he had discussed with his host “how to strengthen military cooperation and how to protect the population.”
Because “the most important thing” for Captain Traoré, “is the security challenge” faced by their two states sharing a border 1200 kilometres long in the Liptako-Gourma area.
“The three-border area or Liptako-Gourma is shared by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It covers 370,000 km2. In Burkina, the Liptako-Gourma covers 19 provinces,” explained Wendpouiré Charles Sawadogo, an observer of Sahelian jihadist movements.
In Burkina Faso, the Sahel region, which includes four provinces, is the most affected by the activities of jihadist groups.
“Moreover, the first terrorist attack on Burkina soil, in 2015, was committed in this area,” recalled Mr Sawadago, stressing that from that incursion, the Sahel region, which includes Oudalan, Séno, Soum and Yagha, was completely destabilised and in turn contaminated the centre-north and east of the country.
From 1 June 2017 to 15 April 2021, the Sahelian branch of the Islamic State claimed 62 attacks in Burkina Faso compared to 59 in Mali and 24 in Niger.
The Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), affiliated to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is also active there.
Present mainly in the Sahel region, this jihadist group is responsible for deadly attacks against Burkinabe security forces and has laid siege to several towns, the most prominent of which in recent weeks is Djibo, less than 100 kilometres from the Malian border.
For Ouagadougou, it is therefore important “to show solidarity and remain united in this struggle”.
This is an imperative for the new Burkinabe authorities in the context of Mali’s withdrawal from the G5 Sahel.
Bamako announced last May it was no longer part of the organisation and was pulling its joint force out of the multi-national force in protest against the refusal for it to assume the presidency of this regional anti-jihadist alliance created in 2014 with Burkina, Chad, Niger and Mauritania.
On 14 June, a leaked confidential memo from the Malian army chief of staff announced the disengagement of its 1,400 military personnel on duty at the command post in Bamako, the West spindle (in Nema, Mauritania) and the Centre spindle (in Niamey), from 30 June.
Consequently, if Mali is not invited to “assume its responsibilities and play its role” within the G5 Sahel, as the Nigerien Minister of Defence demanded at the end of an audience with Lieutenant-Colonel Damiba, the new Burkinabe authorities are counting on a new alliance along the lines of what is being done with Niamey.
Since 10 June 2021, Burkina and Niger have been conducting a joint operation called “Tanli” (cohesion, in the Gullamanchema language spoken in eastern Burkina).
The aim is to secure the border between the two countries.
According to Ouagadougou and Niamey, this necessarily involves neutralising the supporters of jihadist groups on either side of their common border.
At the end of phase 3 of the operation, about a hundred jihadists were killed and some forty suspects were arrested.
But according to Wendpouiré Ch. Sawadogo, these “successes are minimal since Mali is not a party to the operation”.
However, for this observer of jihadist movements, “Burkina will never be able to pacify its north without securing the tri-border area” whose “vulnerability is also the consequence of a lack of consideration for the basic needs of the population”.
AC/id/lb/as/APA