President Bassirou Diomaye Faye is tasked with pulling off an unlikely magic to bring back to the Ecowas fold three countries after their exit from the grouping in January.
Elected almost four months as Senegalese leader, Faye represents one of the true last hopes of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to try to convince Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to reconsider their decision to withdraw from the bloc.
In an interview with APA, Nigerian journalist and researcher Seidik Abba analyzes the 44-year-old leader’s chances of success and the possible reconfigurations in the region if his mediation fails.
President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has been appointed by ECOWAS to mediate talks with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). How do you see his mission, which he will carry out together with his Togolese counterpart, Faure Gnassingbé?
SA: The Senegalese president was chosen because he has a number of assets to carry out this mediation. The ECOWAS sanctions against Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger were imposed when he was not president of Senegal. He cannot therefore be held responsible for that.
This position seems to me to be an element that has been taken into account and gives him all the legitimacy to discuss with his counterparts in these three countries, which are led by military juntas.
His pan-Africanist and sovereignist stance is also appreciated in the public opinion of the three countries. He calls for a pan-Africanism of systemic rupture. This is also what other countries want: a change in relations, especially with former colonizers. This gives him a number of arguments to legitimize himself to go and talk to the countries. The difficulty lies in his ability to convince them to stay in ECOWAS. At the moment, the positions are so far apart that his mission is difficult or even impossible. But in politics there is no impossible and we will see what this mediation will bring.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have closed the door to a return to ECOWAS, while the Senegalese president is optimistic that his mediation will be able to persuade them to reconsider their decision before the end of the notice period scheduled for next January, according to the regional organization’s treaty. What do you think?
The three countries announced at the Niamey summit that their withdrawal from ECOWAS was an irrevocable decision and that at this stage they did not see how they could return to a regional organization that had done them so much wrong. From this point of view, the position is very clear. But if the Senegalese President shows a certain optimism, it may be because he will give guarantees to the demands of these countries.
They believe that ECOWAS is an organization that has suffered from the West and has adopted positions dictated to it by Western capitals. The mission will be absolutely delicate and it will seem almost impossible to reconsider the position. Public opinion will not understand this setback for the member countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The only thing that the Senegalese president might be able to achieve is cooperation between ECOWAS and the AES.
Given the impossibility of bringing them back, how should other ECOWAS countries deal with their AES counterparts?
SA: There are two options: either the break is amicable or brutal. If ECOWAS accepts that the AES countries are now gone, we have to see how to work with them because it is in their common interest. Especially in the context of security issues and the movement of people and property.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are the epicenter of the jihadist threat in West Africa. We can now see that it has crossed the Sahel to reach the Gulf of Guinea. It is already present in Togo, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire. If we want to have an effective response, it must be built by the countries of the Sahel and the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. From this point of view, we can consider cooperation between the Sahel Alliance and the ECOWAS countries. If we can’t do that, bilateral cooperation is another hypothesis.
It should be noted that the countries of the AES Confederation are in sub-regional organizations, from the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), which includes eight countries, to the Council of the Agreement, through the organisation of the Liptako Gourma and the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS). These are organisations that guarantee the free movement of people and goods.
Now, the most difficult thing is, for example, the case of Niger. It is necessary to find a modus operandi with Nigeria, which is not in any of the common sub-regional organizations, except the Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBLT), which includes six countries, including Niger and Nigeria. If we assume that the CBLT guarantees the free movement of people and goods, Niger could have the same principles as today: free movement, visa exemption with Nigeria.
Otherwise, AES citizens who want to travel to ECOWAS countries like Ghana, Nigeria or Sierra Leone will have to get visas.
If the divorce ever happens, it will have to be amicable so that we can see how we can continue to work together. It will be an important compromise to find because we have to avoid penalizing countries and populations. ECOWAS and the AES Confederation have no interest in a brutal divorce or direct confrontation.
What are the risks of disintegration for the community and the institution that constitutes ECOWAS?
SA: The risks are considerable, especially from an economic point of view. In the ECOWAS area, economic exchanges are of the intra-community order. Within this area of fifteen countries, these exchanges are of the order of 15 to 20 percent. If Mali, Burkina and Niger were to leave, this would reduce the level of economic exchanges between countries. There are still many intense relations between Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, between Mali and Senegal, between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire, between Niger and Nigeria. The rupture will lead to a decrease in the volume of intra-regional economic trade.
There will be many difficulties in terms of the free movement of people and goods. Despite everything, there is still a level of integration that we have reached. We have a common ECOWAS passport and a common insurance card. We are even talking about a biometric identity card. We have many things that have made significant progress in terms of integration. With the withdrawal of the three countries, the level of integration will go down. It will be about thirty or forty years of decline in economic integration.
This is the first time in the history of the Community that three countries have decided to leave at the same time. We know that Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2000, but it was only one country. If you look at its geographical position, it is a little further north of the Community area. Its departure had no consequences. But this new dissent is happening in the center of ECOWAS. It will have a significant impact.
This rupture stems in part from ECOWAS’s desire to reinstate Nigerian President Mohamed Bazoum by military force. How should this organization now operate to be more credible and solid?
SA: The military intervention project in Niger is the straw that broke the camel’s back. The problem is the application of the Dakar Supplementary Pact. In 2001, ECOWAS introduced a political component and a good governance component. In reality, the tea towel has begun to burn since the sanctions it took against Mali and Niger, with measures to close the land and air borders following the overthrow of democratically elected regimes.
The military intervention project in Niger is only the drop of water that overflowed the camel’s pot.
It is obvious that ECOWAS must rethink its way of managing political crises in the Community space. It must favor early warning and prevention. We often see political crises coming, including coups, but it is almost inactive at the moment. It is when they happen that ECOWAS deploys all these intervention mechanisms. And we have not seen in recent years the effectiveness of the sanctions it has taken against states.
It must therefore rethink its responses to political and institutional crises in countries, starting with persuasion.
The case of Niger shows that we have to start with discussion. ECOWAS did exactly the opposite. It imposed sanctions and threatened to intervene. Faced with its failure, it came back to discuss with the military authorities. It has to rethink its paradigm of managing institutional and political crises in West Africa.
The current paradigm is not operational. It must do everything to avoid the feeling that the positions it takes are dictated to it.
During the crisis in the Sahel, many people saw that France supported the positions of ECOWAS. This former colonial power even allowed itself to comment on certain decisions of the regional organization before the summits of the heads of state. This confusion gave the latter the feeling that there was an infiltration of France or a possibility of its interference.
A country like Mali, which has no coastline, is very important for Senegal’s balance of trade. How should President Faye reconcile his country’s interests within the framework of bilateral cooperation and the decisions of the ECOWAS community?
SA: Even if President Bassirou Diomaye Faye does not succeed in his mediation, I do not believe that Senegal will turn its back on these three countries. Senegal will continue to have bilateral relations with Mali, which uses the port of Dakar. It will be the same with Burkina Faso, Niger, where there are important Senegalese communities, and vice versa. Senegal will not be in a punitive position towards these countries.
Senegal’s sovereign approach, which has made it clear that there are problems with ECOWAS, means that it will look after its interests first, even if it remains in solidarity with the decisions of the regional organization.
On the other hand, Niger, Burkina and Mali will be able to establish bilateral relations, including agreements on the free movement of persons and goods with Senegal. Moreover, it belongs to UEMOA in the same way as these three countries. Therefore, bilateral relations will withstand the evolution of the situation between the three countries and ECOWAS.
The Senegalese leader is perceived positively and not as an enemy. In Niamey, Ouagadougou and Bamako, there is a certain good opinion of Bassirou Diomaye Faye. Whatever the next decisions of ECOWAS, there will be good relations between Senegal and the AES countries.
ODL/ac/lb/as/APA