The founder of the think tank Wathi, Dr. Gilles Yabi, speaks to APA on the day after the clashes during the banned demonstration of the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) in the capital, Conakry, about the stalemate in which the Guinean transition finds itself.
Ten months after the fall of Alpha Condé, the coup plotters in power in Guinea seem to drag on. What explains this situation?
Anyone who follows coups in the region would not be surprised if there was no transfer of power to civilians through the organisation of free and transparent elections ten months after the overthrow of Alpha Condé.
We expected the transition to last for some time, especially as there were political and institutional reforms to be carried out. Moreover, one of the reasons put forward for the coup d’état was Alpha Condé’s third term in office and the vote on a new constitution to that end.
We therefore imagined that the transition timetable should include a review of the institutions and possibly a new constitution or a revision of the current one. But all this takes time. The most worrying thing is that we have the feeling that there is no political and social dialogue to implement the reforms and to have a clear enough agenda for the rest of the transition.
We should also not forget the profile of the author of the coup, in this case Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, who was in the close circle of Alpha Condé. From the beginning, we could ask ourselves about his real intentions and motivations.
Once he comes to power, it is unfortunately not surprising that there is a temptation for him or some of his close advisers, members of the junta, to stay in power as long as possible to benefit from his privileges. In the political history of Guinea, it has happened that there is a lot of hope and that finally those who come to power strictly reproduce the political practices they denounced.
Colonel Mamady Doumbouya’s coup was widely welcomed by Guinean opinion. A significant part of it is beginning to distance itself from the junta and speaks of the risk of the military seizing power. Is that right?
There is a risk that the military will seize power for a long time. There is no doubt about that. I would remind you that the first indications were for a three-year transition. This is still a long time, even with the reforms to be carried out.
What is even more worrying is the feeling that the transition is essentially guided by the military and followed by civilians. We also have the impression that the junta wants to exclude important stakeholders in Guinean politics from the discussions on the content of the transition.
There are also doubts about the choice of men, especially in the National Transitional Council (CNT). Many people doubt the credibility of some of the leaders of this legislative body and therefore its capacity to carry out the political and institutional reforms expected by the people who hope for a real improvement in governance, changes in political and economic practices that have kept the country in poverty until now.
Unlike the Malian military, the Guinean junta has so far avoided being subjected to sanctions and isolation by the international community. What is the reason for this?
With regard to the sanctions, it must first be stressed that Guinea has benefited from the already complicated transitional situations in the region. The very strong sanctions that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed on Mali made it difficult for the sub-regional organisation to find a way out of the political crisis.
The very negative perception of its role in these transitions at the level of West African public opinion and even beyond has also increased. It therefore became difficult for ECOWAS, with the other coups in Guinea and Burkina, to take the same sanctions and find itself managing tensions in three countries at the same time.
The second important element to be stressed is that Guinea is a rather special country within ECOWAS and especially among French-speaking countries. Guinea has its own currency. It is not a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) franc zone.
Part of the very important sanctions taken against Mali, financial transactions including those that go through the Central Bank, could not be applied to Guinea which has monetary sovereignty. In fact, this reduced the room for manoeuvre of ECOWAS.
The third element relates to the very structure of the Guinean economy, which is highly dependent on mining resources. In a way, it is more complicated to sanction Guinea to have a very strong impact on its economy and on the resources of the state insofar as it can always draw resources directly from the mining sector.
All these elements probably explain the rather rapid perception on the part of regional and international actors of the need to have a slightly different approach to Guinea in terms of the relevance of sanctions. That said, discussions are continuing. ECOWAS, favouring the diplomatic route, has appointed a mediator.
On the side of the transitional authorities in Mali, the question of sovereignty is frequently raised. Guinea, on the other hand, has a much older culture of sovereignty. This heritage is still very present.
It is a country that is much more difficult to sanction and isolate because it can basically adapt easily. A final element that distinguishes Guinea from Mali or Burkina is its openness to the Atlantic Ocean.
Guinea has access to the sea which makes trade sanctions ineffective. With the Port of Conakry, Guinea is less vulnerable to such sanctions. However, there are traditional sanctions already in place such as the suspension of the country from ECOWAS bodies.
ARD/id/lb/abj/APA