Journalist, influential civil rights activist and keen observer of current events in the Sahel, Moussa Tchangari, the Secretary General of the Nigerien association dubbed Alternative, gives to APA, a bird’s-eye view of Monday’s summit in Pau, France, which brought together the French president and his peers of the G5 Sahel countries.
Interview by Lemine Ould M. Salem
Was the Pau Summit between the five heads of State of the G5 Sahel and French President, Emmanuel Macron, justified?
The summit is only justified from the point of view of French President Emmanuel Macron, who convened it. And as everyone knows, Macron convened the summit for only one reason: obtain a declaration from the heads of state of the Sahel saying that they are asking for a French military presence in their country. After the death of 13 French soldiers in Mali last December, the French president needed such a statement to short-circuit possible calls from public opinion in France for the withdrawal of their troops, which could question the maintenance of a military mission, which has not demonstrated its effectiveness, which is financially costly for the country, and, moreover, strongly disapproved of by public opinion in G-5 Sahel countries.
What is your assessment of the summit?
In Pau, the French president got what he wanted. On Monday, around the table, he was obviously the only one wearing a smile, even if he was particularly annoyed by a question posed by a Malian journalist. The other leaders looked pretty morose. And everyone understood that they themselves felt ridiculed and humiliated.
The outcome of this summit is not encouraging. The few measures taken sometimes raise questions. First of all, France is only prepared to send 220 additional troops, which will not change anything, fundamentally, even if they are combined with the initial troops from a European Special Forces unit called Takouba (sabre in Tamashek, a Tuareg local language).
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Next, the establishment of a joint command is announced, which suggests that the French army will take the lead in the war and that forces in the Sahel are in an auxiliary position in their own countries. Finally, France itself is in the position to seek the support of other countries, namely Europeans, to provide Special Forces units, the US to continue to give some assistance to its Barkhane Operation in the Sahel, other countries around the world to dish out the money needed to buy military equipment and fund various projects.
The interest of this summit is that it came to confirm all that seasoned observers had been saying for a long time, that France is in a situation of failure in the Sahel and that it seeks, in case it cannot leave, the support of other countries to pursue a mission, whose chances of success are very low.
The final declaration of the summit is a kind of confession, compared to the criticisms from Sahelian civil society, researchers and even sometimes soldiers: Macron and his Sahelian friends agree that Barkhane did not have a clear political and legal framework; they agree that there was no good coordination between the different forces; they agree that the French presence is the subject of strong opposition from the public, even if they attribute this to other rival powers, which would instigate the so-called anti-French rhetoric and demonstrations; they agree that nothing has been done to ensure the redeployment of state infrastructures to certain areas affected by the conflict, especially Kidal, whose status has been implicitly mentioned.
By declaring the jihadists presence in the so-called “three borders” zone as new priority targets, are France and the G5 Sahel making the right choice?
The “Three Borders” area has become the epicenter of the armed conflict, since it is the place where most attacks on the armed forces and populations are reported. Of course, everyone understands that everything has been done to move the epicenter of the conflict from the north to the centre of Mali, and in particular to this area of the three borders. This shift in the centre of gravity makes it possible to say that there is nothing more to do in the northern part of Mali, apart from implementing the Algiers Peace Agreement, against which there is a certain mistrust within Malian public opinion and political circles, and clear reluctance on the part of Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and his government.
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As everyone knows, France considers that separatists in northern Mali do not pose a threat; for France, they constitute a political force with which we can and must negotiate. They are in fact France’s protégés; and that is why the vice-president of the defense committee of the French National Assembly recently spoke of reform of the structures of states as one of the key elements of the response to the crisis in Mali. Structuring is of course understood as a waiver of the principle of a unique state.
What is striking is that France has succeeded in convincing (euphemistically) the Sahel leaders that there is only one enemy against which we must act, the Islamic State for example. All other actors in non-state violence are considered acceptable people with whom we can consider negotiations, apart from Boko Haram, which is not perceived, for reasons that need to be elucidated, as a matter of concern for France. We can say that all this is vague and deserves to be interrogated.
In your opinion, what explains the spread of jihadist violence everywhere in the Sahel?
The first thing that comes to mind is that the Sahelian states have virtually done nothing to prevent this from happening. The root causes of the emergence of jihadist violence, and not only it, are well known to all. They boil down to the frustrations engendered by the crisis in democracy, daily injustices, the lack of prospects for a better life, the erosion of traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms, etc. Jihadist violence has taken place in areas where state violence has always been strong, areas where the state has not thought of providing the populations with basic public services, areas where local conflicts have gone unresolved, areas where the struggle for access and control of natural resources has become increasingly bitter. Of course, we can further extend the list of reasons that led to the spread of jihadist violence throughout the Sahel; but, we can do without this exercise, we can just say that violence has spread because states have never seriously considered a response to jihadist violence other than traditional state violence.
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How do you think we can end jihadist violence in the Sahel?
If we want to put an end to jihadist violence and all the other forms of violence that are expressed today in the Sahel region, we will have to (re)define a new social contract between states and citizens. The attainment of human rights, in particular economic, social and cultural rights, must be placed at the heart of public action. The Sahel will never experience peace and stability as long as millions of people continue to face hunger, and millions of young people have no prospects for a better life. The Sahel will not know peace as long as citizens have the feeling of living in countries where there is no justice, where access to material and goods depends on positions of power, where public officials are corrupt and can cash in on any service until obtaining a civil status paper. These questions, the Pau summit did not even mention them, simply because Sahelian heads of state, like their French mentors, are merely concerned with maintaining a system that has reached its limits and that is not under fire from jihadists alone.
LOS/te/fss/as/APA