A senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS Africa) in the West Africa office in charge of the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, Hassan Kone explains to for APA News, the ins and outs of the dialogue his organization calls for between Sahelian countries’ governments and jihadist groups.
In a recent study by this think tank, which you co-authored, the need for dialogue between Sahelian governments and jihadist groups is strongly advocated. Why?
The idea of dialogue with the jihadists in the Sahel, or some of them, is based on a simple observation: for the past ten years, the defense and security forces of the various countries in this region, supported by important foreign partners, such as France and the European Force Takuba, have not been able to eradicate the jihadist threat that they are trying to fight. Since military action alone has not been able to solve the problem, the idea of considering other options becomes obvious. It is not a matter of simply abandoning the security option. It is a matter of combining it with other means that have proven their worth elsewhere.
This approach, which is intended to be more inclusive, implies recourse to mediation, particularly by traditional and religious authorities. But above all, it implies exploring political solutions likely to convince the jihadists or some of them to abandon the use of violence. This path, which can be likened to a sort of “hand out” policy, necessarily involves dialogue. It has been successful in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and in the Maghreb. There is no reason why it should not be tried in the Sahel.
Are these groups realistic enough to accept dialogue with governments whose legitimacy they dispute?
In general, jihadists are not radically closed to dialogue. This is probably all the more true for groups linked to Al Qaeda than for those affiliated with the Islamic State.
It is true that their demands are, in some respects, difficult for states to accept. But in the Sahel, there are elements that could make this dialogue easier than in other regions of the world. For example, if we take the three Sahelian countries where the jihadist threat is most evident, which are Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, most of the Islamist fighters are nationals. A majority of them have joined these groups not for ideological, but for political or social reasons. Our research at the Institute for Security Studies in Africa (ISS Africa) has shown that many of the young people involved in these groups did it to protect, defend, or avenge their communities against real or perceived abuses by government security forces or other armed groups. Sometimes, they also did it to protect their ethnic communities’ property or means of subsistence.
This diversity of profiles is an essential element to be taken into account in the dialogue that ISS Africa advocates between governments and these groups.
What compromises can be made with jihadist groups in the Sahel?
Before considering any dialogue with jihadists, governments must address the reasons behind their choice to use weapons. Once this has been done, dialogue itself can be considered. As part of the concessions that governments might make, they should not be afraid to offer the option of forgiveness in return for giving up their weapons. The desired dialogue could also be part of a kind of political agreement, or a unilateral proposal by the authorities, in the form of “national reconciliation.” The solution is to show political imagination and courage.
In some individual cases, it is possible, for example, to release prisoners whose personal situation allows it according to the law. If the law permits, authorities can encourage mitigation of sentences for some convicts. Once released, individuals should also be able to benefit from a rigorous social insertion plan.
Curriculum reforms in Koranic schools should also be considered. Theological education in these schools should be accompanied by training courses for income-generating activities.
Changes in the judicial system could be made, depending on the country and the situation. The “cadi,” the Muslim judge who has always existed in countries such as Mauritania, Niger and even Mali, could have his status clarified or improved. This function is highly valued by the populations because of its traditional role as a mediator and effective regulator of certain social conflicts.
In the same spirit, the States should not forget an essential subject: the crisis of pastoralism. In Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, as well as in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, such as Benin or Togo, which are beginning to be affected by the jihadist threat, the problem is a major cause of Islamist violence. In all these countries, pastoralists have problems accessing pasture. With the increase in population, land is being over-exploited for agriculture, making grazing areas less available. This situation creates tensions between transhumant herders and sedentary farmers, forcing the former to commit acts of banditry or criminality if they are unable to feed their livestock adequately.
Your study cites the example of Mauritania, where a dialogue between religious leaders and jihadist detainees has contributed to the repentance of a majority of the latter. Can it serve as a model?
The dialogue initiated in 2010 by the Mauritanian government with some of the jihadists was an undisputable success. The fact that since 20011, one year after the launch of this dialogue, no jihadist operations have taken place in the country is partly explained by the results of this initiative.
While it can serve as an example for other Sahelian countries currently facing the jihadist threat, the Mauritanian case cannot be copied without being adapted to local realities.
In Mauritania, the dialogue was purely doctrinal, due to the fact that the majority of young Mauritanians who joined jihadist groups or who supported armed jihad at the time made a choice based on religious conviction.
In other countries of the region, the reasons for their citizens to join armed Islamist groups are often different. Motivations in these countries are largely dominated by the need to protect oneself or one’s family from real or perceived external aggression, whether by regular forces or other armed groups.
The Mauritanian model cannot therefore be exported without adaptation to the specific context of each country; otherwise, it will not work.
FK/AS/CD/Los/fss/abj/APA