It is difficult to look beyond Covid-19 as it now predetermines our daily lives, writes renowned Mauritanian jurist Mahmoud Ould Mohamed Salah in a personal reflection on the possible fallout from the pandemic.
By Professor Mahmoud Ould Mohamed Salah
From the prescriptions on “social barrier gestures” (regular hand washing, social distancing…) to partial lockdowns coupled with curfews, we live to the rhythm of the constraints of the “war” imposed by an invisible, devious, insidious enemy, who kills, massively, while imposing itself into the lives of those who have been spared this game of Russian roulette in which it excels.
More than three months after its outbreak in the city of Wuhan, China, this capricious virus has not yet revealed all its mysteries.
And no one can say when and in what state the world will emerge from the multidimensional crisis it has provoked.
For us Africans, the uncertainty could not be greater as the WHO has just warned that the worst is yet to come, adding to the anguish a sense of imminence about an end to the world as we know it.
In this context, which is conducive to the resurgence of eschatological predictions, what can be done better than to pray and to respect the recommendations not to expose oneself and others to danger?
Observing the recommendations of the health authorities becomes the only way for everyone to compensate one’s individual impotence and to participate in the fight against the spread of the virus in a country where the war against evil can only be won through prevention, the health system being unable to cope with an explosion in the number of cases requiring hospital care.
Minimal civility and realism go hand in hand here.
Proven “globalised risk”
Like everywhere, we are at war and, as everywhere, we can only rely on ourselves because one of the paradoxical lessons of this crisis is that despite the global nature of the crisis, the responses provided have been and remain, particularly in the health field, national responses, thereby depending on the state of each country’s health system, the quality and commitment of its health workers, the sense of responsibility and civic-mindedness of its citizens, the individual and collective resilience of its populations and the organization and effectiveness of its system of government.
Anyway, it is always, in the first instance, the nation state that is called upon to find the appropriate response to a crisis, whatever its origin and scale, as soon as it affects people on its territory.
But what has happened to globalisation and the myriad organisations, institutions, actors and rules that have promoted and disseminated it?
Why, in the face of a proven “globalised risk,” can we not yet conceive of an immediate globalised response?
Other questions arise in the wake of this first questioning. Why have health issues, which are so essential insofar as they directly affect people’s lives, not been sufficiently taken into account in times of peace, including those in the world’s superpowers?
How did we come to the situation where thousands of billions of dollars will have to be injected in the fight against the disease?
The G20 has committed to injecting $5 trillion.
The United States has just adopted a $2 trillion economic recovery plan hoping to curb or simply alleviate a crisis that could have been prevented and could have been better treated, if there had been no cuts in the funds allocated to health (scientific research, health industry, hospital staff…)?
Why is it that in large countries there may still be shortages of face masks, respirators and even testing kits? Is it because the precepts of the dominant economic doctrine prohibiting budget deficits and imposing on the state the role of guarantor of major balances have been rigidly and therefore foolishly followed?
Have we not delegated to market forces more than is necessary, allowing them to invade sectors of social activity that should not be subject only to the criteria of market rationality, such as education, health and the environment? Above all, how can we start afresh, drawing the right lessons from this pandemic?
How can we put an end to the schizophrenia that consists in proclaiming, just about everywhere, adherence to the objectives of sustainable development – which presupposes that the economic dimension be articulated with the social and environmental dimensions, and that the satisfaction of the needs of current generations be compatible with the rights of future generations – while, in fact, adopting a model of development in which the market economy and finance over-determine the rest of social activities?
It is not certain that these issues will be the main focus of the debates that will dominate the way out of the crisis.
So strong is the pressure of the short term.
However, the global nature of the pandemic may play a positive role in this respect.
The fruit of globalisation
Covid-19 was the cause of the first global health crisis, in every sense of the word. It is the fruit of globalisation. It appeared for the first time in the country which, in a record time in history, undertook the most profound and comprehensive transformation that a country can make to ensure its economic take-off and become, in less than three decades, a major force of globalisation.
At the confluence of what are now called value chains – an expression that refers to the worldwide fragmentation of the manufacturing process of a product, with the various components of that product being produced by different entities of a transnational group, scattered in different countries – China is a central stakeholder in globalisation which, through interdependencies maintained by the new organisation of transnational firms, is at the same time becoming a component of the economy of almost all the states that matter.
Hitting the Chinese economy means hitting the economy of most states, which explains why the first concerns of the countries not yet affected by the virus were essentially economic and not health-related.
But in order to satisfy its global ambition, Covid-19 had to attack the rest of the world.
It did so by using one of the most common vectors of globalisation: using the supersonic speed of aircraft, it spread to the rest of the world, starting with the major centres of globalisation.
In early March, WHO announced that Europe has become the new epicentre of the pandemic. It is still the epicentre in terms of the number of recorded deaths. But in terms of the number of infected people, it is now the United States that takes the lead. In fact, no continent is spared. The infection now affects 180 countries. Covid-19 thus wins the first round of its fight for universality, i.e. the planetary dimension of the health crisis.
But this crisis quickly became global, from another point of view. It now affects all aspects of social life and, first and foremost, the driving force of social life in modern societies, namely the economy. This has less to do with the increase in health spending than with the consequences of restrictive measures that slow down, or even paralyse economic activity, potentially calling for cascading loopholes in almost all economic sectors.
The force of the “shock” is such that the main actors of globalisation are pushing states to intervene massively to help weakened sectors, companies and employees and avoid the economic and social chaos that is looming. The European Union is authorising an easing of budgetary constraints and a relaxation of the rules on state aid, triggering recourse to the “exceptional circumstances” clause, and is even saying it is ready to activate the “general crisis clause” which allows the suspension of the Stability Pact. The states are each getting their act together to protect their economies and their populations and to organise at their own level the management of health emergencies, which have now become economic and social in nature.
In France, the government has an enabling law that allows it to adopt 25 ordinances in a single cabinet meeting. It was not so much a return to Colbert as to post-war economic law and in particular the famous ordinances of 1945 which served as the legal basis for economic regulations until their repeal in 1986. The United States in turn adopted a gigantic Economic Recovery Plan, some elements of which revived the spirit of Roosevelt’s New Deal. President Trump even went so far as to revive the “Defense Production Act,” promulgated during the Korean War, to oblige General Motors to manufacture 100,000 respirators within a month.
However, this is not enough to sustainably reinvigorate the financial markets, which set the temperature of the economy, because they know that until the response is global, the crisis cannot be contained.
An almost uniform media treatment
Admittedly, the G20’s intervention was well received by the various stock exchanges. But blowing hot and cold, they were once again heated by the lack of agreement between the European Union countries at the March 27 mini-summit. In fact, given the interdependence between the health crisis and the economic crisis, the outcome of the economic recession will also depend on the world’s ability to curb the pandemic.
Finally, the Covid-19 crisis is also a global crisis, from the point of view of the related communication. It is the subject of an almost uniform media treatment which makes it the exclusive subject of news that penetrates the intimacy of every home. We all follow the irresistible geographical extension of the lockdown, the geometric progression of the infection, country by country, the dizzying increase in the number of dead people, but also the controversies over chloroquine and the background, not always reassuring, of the polemics between scientists that it reveals, or again the crying lack of solidarity between states, including within well-integrated regional groupings, such as the European Union, with Italy finding assistance only from China or Cuba!
We are instantaneously and simultaneously informed of the evolution of this crisis. And this globalisation of information, in contrast to the closure of state borders and the lockdown, is fostering the emergence of a global awareness of common perils and world issues.
It is reasonable to hope that this will not be without consequences for the redefinition of the rules of the game at the end of the crisis. For some, the rules have already been written. The world order that would emerge from the current crisis would have nothing in common with the former. It would seal the end of globalisation, the shortcomings of which would have been revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic. This, it seems to me, is a quick fix.
In order to know what rules will emerge from the post-crisis period, we must first determine which actors will write these rules. In this respect, the Covid-19 pandemic has been compared to a war, because of the violence of its human, economic and social consequences. And when a war ends, it is the victors who write the rules that transcribe the new balance of power. To take the example of the Second World War, the international economic order that emerged from it was conceived by the United States and its British allies a few years before the end of the conflict. At that time they planned to set up, once the conflict was over, an organisation of international economic relations with a financial, monetary and commercial component inspired by their liberal conceptions.
The first two components of this organisation came into being, on July 22, 1944, in a New Hampshire town, when, after three weeks of negotiations, delegates from some forty countries signed the famous agreements establishing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). As for the third, although it was not immediately forthcoming, an ersatz to lay the foundations for the gradual liberalisation of trade was found through the 1948 GATT before the WTO, a grouping whose universality was strengthened by the accession of China and Russia, took over in 1995.
It was these three organizations, IMF, IBRD, WTO (successor to GATT), inspired by the ideas of the victors of the Second World War and then the Cold War (for the WTO), that fostered the rise and spread of economic globalisation and increased interdependence. But while at the end of an interstate war, both the winners and the losers are easily identifiable, in the “war against the coronavirus,” things are more complicated, hence the limits of the martial metaphor applied to this pandemic. All states risk coming out of it weakened, if only because of the massive indebtedness that will result. Some believe that China will be better off because it has already managed to halt the spread of the virus on its territory and gradually resume its activities, adding that this would encourage a questioning of globalisation. However, this analysis is based on a misjudgement of China’s position in relation to globalisation.
The Chinese “model”
At the Davos Summit in 2018, China was the champion of globalisation because it is the country that benefits most from it. It is for the WTO, whose Dispute Settlement Mechanism it fully supports.
After a period of being “in the counterfeiting business,” it now has an objective interest in defending the Intellectual Property Agreement tooth and nail, as it has become the country with the most patent applications from companies. It has also strengthened its presence in the main governance bodies of globalisation (IMF, G20, etc.) and has itself created, or encouraged the creation of new bodies (the “BRICS”, bringing together the main emerging countries; the Asian Infrastructure Bank, created in 2014, in which China is the largest shareholder; the New Development Bank or BRICS Bank, etc.) with the aim of influencing the course of globalisation in order to have a greater influence, but not to upset the global system.
The path taken by China since the policy of openness initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 has two beacons: economic liberalism and democratic centralism, championed by Adam Smith and Karl Marx, united in a baroque team of formidable efficiency that the slogan “the socialist market economy” sums up well. It is an original path, the product of the encounter between the extraordinary adaptability of the capitalist system and the survival instinct of a Communist Party which, certainly, knows how to negotiate the compromises necessary for its survival.
But China’s wisdom has so far been not to set up this unprecedented experiment that has propelled it into the court of the leading countries of globalisation as a model to be exported or a potion to be “imposed.”
China adheres to the classical conception of international law, which pins that right solely on the principle of state sovereignty and its corollaries, the freedom of each state to choose its political, economic and social system and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, insisting on the values of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and rejecting the new notions promoted by post-cold war international law, such as the right to democracy, the duty to interfere and the responsibility to protect.
In short, yes to economic globalisation, no to legal and political globalisation, which it considers, like the Russian Federation, which is an ally that can be mobilised in this field, an instrument at the service of Western hegemony. It is difficult to see how the coronavirus pandemic will affect China’s strategic position.
The other protagonist, still powerful and – for at least another decade, still dominant, is the United States. Contrary to what some of President Trump’s statements may have implied, the United States does not dispute the globalisation for which it has been the main driving force in economic, legal and political terms.
It only intends to renegotiate the agreements concluded with certain trading partners – China, the European Union, Mexico and Canada – as well as the WTO Agreement, in particular its provisions relating to the functioning of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which is accused of overstepping its remit. It is not yet known what the long-term effects of the pandemic on U.S. public opinion will be. It is possible that if the crisis continues and the number of deaths rises significantly, the political demand for greater social protection may eventually lead to lasting changes in the legal and economic system.
The third important stakeholder is the European Union. Until now, it has been one of the major supporters of globalisation.
It defends the WTO even if it considers that China does not respect all its rules. It is concerned about mergers and acquisitions by Chinese companies in Europe but does not close its territory to Chinese foreign investment. It has just concluded a Comprehensive Trade Agreement with Canada that opens economic borders and increases trade between the parties.
A more humane globalisation
However, its position on globalisation could change as a result of the unprecedented health crisis that is affecting it today, one of the foreseeable consequences of which is the increased rejection of liberal policies by the people of Europe. This should result in particular in greater importance being given to health and environmental considerations, not only at national level but also at international level, where free trade will give way whenever necessary to the protection of health or the biosphere.
In order to achieve this development in a sustainable manner, many international agreements, including WTO’s, will probably have to be renegotiated. Then we can give words their true meaning and talk about global public goods and a more humane, i.e. fairer globalization.
In this regard, it should be recalled that the WTO round of negotiations, launched in Doha two months after the attacks that toppled the twin towers of Manhattan, focused precisely on a work programme designating “an ambitious agenda for fair globalisation.” To speak of equity is to evoke the glaring imbalances that fracture international society, including that linked to disparate levels of development.
Here, too, the coronavirus pandemic could have catastrophic effects. In a continent such as ours which, despite the persistence of worrying factors, has been able to revive hope, with a steady growth rate of around 5 percent and relative but real progress in terms of democracy, Covid-19 resembles a curse.
In order to ward off bad luck and prevent Africa from sinking into economic, social and political regression, strong gestures from the international community will be needed, the least of which should be, as proposed by former IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, an initiative comparable to the “”Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” programme of 2005, leading to a massive cancellation of the debt of the world’s poorest countries.
If there is a good lesson to be learned from this crisis, which has spared none, to paraphrase Edgar Morin, interdependence without solidarity makes no sense.
Contrary to the many reflections circulating online, written in the wake of the otherwise perfectly legitimate anger aroused by the dysfunctions of globalisation, we do not believe, however, that globalisation will end with the current pandemic. Covid-19 is not an anti-globalisation activist, and globalisation is not reduced to the liberal path it has taken so far.
The globalised world in which we live is the result of a combination of economic factors (free movement of capital, goods and services and resulting interdependence between firms and states or groups of states), technological factors (to means of transport that reduce distances have been added new information technologies that contract both space and time) and geopolitical factors (collapse of the Soviet bloc) that interact, creating a system of generalised interdependence that will survive the Tsunami caused by the coronavirus.
But this globalized world is by no means a homogenous world. It has few common compasses and is worked by multiple and evolving contradictions. A general victory of populist parties – right or left – in one of the major centres of globalisation, such as the European Union, would have certain consequences on the trajectory of globalisation but would not eliminate it.
We shall conclude this brief reflection by asking what impact Covid-19 might have on one of the contradictions of the globalized world, popularized in recent decades by the formula of the “clash of civilizations”.
Although it is difficult to distinguish between what is purely ideological, or even political manipulation, and what is real, and although basic observation shows that many recent conflicts, presented as an illustration of the “clash of civilisations,” are more banal than classic territorial or economic conflicts, it cannot be denied that the end of the East-West confrontation has favoured the rise and multiplication of identity conflicts in which religious, cultural and civilizational factors in the broadest sense play an important role.
In spite of the truce to which it incites (but this incitement applies to all types of conflicts), the coronavirus pandemic is unlikely to change much to this situation except in two extreme cases. The first is a victory for right-wing populism, which would then exacerbate the conflict.
The second – and it is not forbidden to dream – concerns the optimistic scenario of a conversion of minds at the end of this formidable test of the ideas of equality, justice and mutual respect between peoples, paving the way for a new international order that would at least temporarily overcome the contradiction.
Covid-19 would thus have a pacifying virtue in spite of itself. But wouldn’t it be irrational to place hopes for change in the consequences induced by the breaking of a serial killer virus?
The title of this article has been changed by the editors for reasons related to Apanews editing standards. The original title is: “Au-delà du Covid-19: Ou que le coronavirus nous dit des paradoxes du monde globalise.”
This article was originally published on March 31, 2020 in the Mauritanian newspaper Le Calame. Apanews republishes it today because of its extreme relevance.
About the Author
** Professor in private law and criminal sciences (French aggregation exam, Paris, February 1989)
Professor at the University of Nouakchott (since 1989)
Associate Professor at the University of Nice (1998 – 1999)
Professor invited at several foreign universities (University of Paris I, University of Bourgogne, University of Orleans, and Gaston-Berger University of Saint-Louis, Senegal) and at the Academy of International Law (The Hague).
Board member of the International Economic Law Association
Founding member of the Euro-African Institute of Economic Law
Former member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Administrative Sciences.
Lawyer of the Nouakchott Bar.
Senior Legal Adviser to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (UN) (November 2003 – November 2005) set up by the Secretary General of the United Nations for the implementation of the ICJ ruling on the border between the two countries.
Author of various publications including: “The contradictions of globalised law” PUF, 2002, and “The irruption of human rights in the international economic order: myth or reality?” LGDJ-lextenso, 2012.
APA