Olivier Fourt, a journalist specializing in defense matters explains the craze for the use of drones by non-state armed groups to launch attacks.
By Abdou Ciss
What explains this craze by non-state armed groups for drones?
OF: The threat of “consumer” drones from the civilian sector has been identified for nearly a decade in Europe. As we have seen in Syria or Iraq, these drones, the most common of which are the Chinese-built DJI, are very accessible, as they are freely available on the Internet, via online sites like Amazon. For a few hundred dollars, you can buy a small, reliable and easy-to-use machine. Prices then increase according to the payload you wish to mount.
Getting started is easy. Many tutorials on the Internet allow you to improve your skills, both in piloting and in technical aspects. Modifications are also quite easy, and the use of these leisure machines can indeed be diverted to make an attack drone capable of dropping a small load vertically. At the beginning, these were often 40mm grenades on which a small plastic tail was mounted in order to stabilize the fall of the projectile and thus gain precision.
That said, in some countries, it will be easier to find explosives than to buy a drone on the Internet and have it delivered. The question of access to systems is important, especially for the most advanced modules. However, the fact that these drones come from the civilian “consumer” range allows for “blurring the cards.” It is not forbidden to own a drone in Europe and to use it under certain conditions. We can therefore imagine a transfer of these tools across the Sahel, for example, from areas where their purchase is relatively easy to the more isolated conflict zones. But also direct purchases by local companies with a priori guarantees, with a view to a later detour.
Customs and intelligence have an important role to play in preventing the proliferation of these devices. In Europe, the civilian drone is not considered a weapon, although it can become one. The drone can also be used for reconnaissance flights, or for propaganda purposes. In fact, this is its primary use in the hands of an armed group. It can also be a “psychological” weapon, with overflights that could be described as harassment, intended to tire out the sentries who will have to maintain a high level of alert over time.
Do these drones constitute a threat to African countries facing jihadist insurgencies?
OF: Yes, they are “techno-guerrilla” tools, that is to say, the use of technically advanced (but low-cost) means, as part of an insurgency scheme. The problem is that terrorist groups often move faster than states to take advantage of new technologies. In the Middle East, the Islamic State’s use of small armed and/or suicide drones has revolutionized urban combat. Jihadist militiamen have been able to integrate them into infantry maneuvers, and these weapons, then of a new type, were feared by Iraqi counter-terrorism.
It is not a “miracle weapon,” but the mini-UAV can do many things if it is well used. In Ukraine, quadcopter drones of the commercial range have also reappeared, to go and see on the “other side” of a tree line or behind a building. The extraction of GPS coordinates or the designation of targets is also possible depending on the optics and sensors carried. It’s all a question of price, size and weight.
The quality of the images broadcast and their “distribution” to the right actors on the ground without too much degradation of the data are also very important for a real use on a battlefield. The Ukrainians use a lot of civilian mini-UAVs for tactical targeting, but mostly during the day. So civilian drones in the hands of a GAT are a “plus” for its movements, again, I stress the psychological effect that a “raid” of several drones (not to mention swarm attacks) or even simple repeated overflights could have if the states are not able to stop them.
What should be the attitude of states to minimize this risk?
OF: Countermeasures exist and are known. In Africa, on paper, the purchase and use of drones are much more regulated than in Europe. Legislation in this area is quite restrictive, which places a significant constraint on professional users of civilian drones in the fields of health, agriculture, cartography, photography, etc.
Some areas, such as military sites, are forbidden to fly over, but in principle this applies to all forms of aircraft, including drones. Finally, the fight against drones is being organized, with rudimentary means such as visual range lookout followed by destruction by firearms, or more sophisticated solutions allowing for alert (often with very short delays), jamming (occasional or permanent) and/or neutralization.
Remember that these are civilian drones which are not “hardened” and whose frequencies are known to all. But even on a leisure drone, certain autonomous flight modes can complicate the interception of the mobile. Cutting the ground link may not be enough.
It is important to underline at this level that if the physical destruction of the machine can allow for fending off an attack, the exploitation of data or traces contained in the drone as well as its flight tracking can lead to the recovery of precious clues in order to trace the users.
However, this work is more akin to forensic science than to aerial defense.
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